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1. Introduction 
 
Research in the field of functional representation
1
 in Central and Eastern 
Europe has evolved significantly over the last few years
2
. However, it still 
occupies a minor place compared with literature relating to political parties or 
party systems in this region. Shyly started at the beginning of the 90s, the 
research on interest groups and social partners has been developed 
progressively. Scholars have paid particular attention to the countries known 
for the dynamism of their civil societies under the communist regimes, or for 
their democratic tradition before the establishment of communism in the region.  
Accordingly, if in the first part of the decade, researchers showed 
particular interest to the emergence of new political actors or to the 
introduction of a democratic legal framework, attention has gradually turned 
from the institutional or constitutional aspects of the triple transition(s)
3
 to two 
                                                          
  Université Libre de Bruxelles. 
1  For the purpose of this paper, functional representation refers to the semi-institutionalised 
patterns of conduct and consultation between permanent officials and the representatives of 
interest organisations. A similar definition is proposed by M. BRENNER, (1969), “Functional 
Representation and Interest Group Theory: Some Notes on British Practice”, Comparative 
Politics, vol. 2, no. 1, 1969, pp. 111-134.  
2  See A. AGH et al., Parliaments and Organized Interests: The Second Step, Hungarian Centre for 
Democracy Studies Foundation, Budapest, 1996; O. PEDERSEN, K. RONIT, J. HAUSNER, 
“Organized Interests and the Labour Market in Postcommunist  Europe”,  American Behavioural Scientist, 
vol. 38, no. 5, 1995, pp. 741-759; D. FINK-HAFNER, “Organized interests in the policy-making 
process in Slovenia”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 5, no. 2, 1998, pp. 285-
302; N. SOLORZANO-BORRAGAN, “The Organisation of Business Interests in Central and 
Eastern Europe for EU Representation”, in J. Grenwood (ed.), The Challenge of Change in EU 
Business,  Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, pp. 61-85. 
3  K. OFFE, “Vers le capitalisme par construction démocratique ? La théorie de la démocratisation et la 
triple transition en Europe de l‟Est”, Revue française de science politique, vol. 42, no. 6, 1992, pp. 923-42. 
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new topics. The first one is the question of accession to the European Union 
and its impact on the domestic politics, policies and polities
4
, and the second 
one is the relationship between state and society in the new Member States of 
the EU and candidate countries
5
. If the interest of researchers in the process of 
Europeanization may be explained by the radical transformations undergone in 
order to accommodate European integration
6
 and by the explanatory power of 
this concept for understanding the domestic political continuity or change in the 
applicant countries
7
, interest in the state/civil society relationships emerged for 
two main reasons. Indeed, by addressing this question, some authors aimed at 
invalidating
8
 a widespread view in the literature regarding the weakness of 
post-communist civil societies in the region
9
, while others intended to analyse 
the impact of European Union integration on interest politics in Central and 
Eastern Europe
10. Therefore, some authors offered a “path dependent” analysis 
of the emergence of interest groups in the region, trying to explain, through 
case studies, “the communist legacies susceptible to affect the development of 
these new actors”11, while others paid particular attention to the hypothetical 
effects of the socialisation and learning processes resulting from the affiliation 
of national interest groups to European federations of interest representation. 
Within this frame, trade unions and employers‟ associations emerge as a 
separate area of investigation, in the field of industrial relations. 
However, if in this emergent literature there is a relative variety of 
aspects submitted to analysis, there still exists an imbalance as far as 
                                                          
4  K. GOETZ, “Making sense of post-communist central administration: modernization, 
Europeanization or Latinization?”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 8, no. 6, 2001, pp. 1032-1051; 
H. GRABBE, “How does Europeanization affect CEE governance? Conditionality, diffusion and 
diversity”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 8, no. 6, 2001, pp. 1013-1031; B. LIPPERT, 
G. UMBACH, W. WESSELS, “Europeanization of CEE executives: EU membership negotiation 
as a shaping power”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 8, no. 6, 2001, pp. 980-1012; 
D. PAPADIMITROU, “Exporting Europeanization: EU enlargement, the twinning exercise  and 
administrative reform in Eastern Europe”, paper presented at the European Consortium for 
Political Research Joint Sessions, Turin, 22-27 April, 2002.  
5  T. COX, L. VASS, “Government-Interest Group Relations in Hungarian Politics since 1989”, Europe-Asia 
Studies, vol. 52, no. 6, 2000, p. 1095.  
6  G. PRIDHAM, “Transnational Party Cooperation and Post-Communist Politics: Evaluating 
Euroscepticism in Comparative Perspective”, Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Session, Turin, 
22-27 April, 2002.  
7  S. HIX, K. GOETZ, “Introduction: European Integration and National Political Systems”, 
West European Politics, vol. 23, no. 4, 2000.  
8  FINH-HAFNER, art. cit.  
9  P. KOPECKY, C. MUDDE, “Rethinking Civil Society”, Democratization, vol. 10, no. 3, 2003. 
10  M. FOREST, “La représentation des intérêts de genre dans les nouveaux Etats membres : 
entre post-communisme et européanisation”, paper presented at the seminar “Société civile 
organisée et gouvernance européenne. Formation, recrutement et pratiques des représentants 
d‟intérêt dans l‟Union européenne”, Strasbourg, 21-23 June 2004.  
11  Ibidem. 
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geographical criterion is concerned. Some countries are less scrutinised than 
others, Romania being one of them. The apathy of civil society during the communist 
regime, as well as its lack of symbolic dimension
12
 and dynamism in the first years 
of the transition to democracy, seems to be the two main explanations for scarce research 
into this matter. Under these conditions, the aim of this paper is to apprehend 
whether 15 years after the collapse of the communism these academic 
considerations are still in accordance with the Romanian political landscape.  
Taking the case of trade unions and employers‟ associations, they are 
now involved in different tripartite bodies and institutions, created in the context of 
Romania‟s accession to European Union, but the question which is constantly 
addressed is concerned with the role that they effectively play in the Romanian labour 
policies.  
Therefore, in the attempt to answer this question, our paper is focused on 
a particular policy issue, that is to say the recent amendment of the Romanian 
Labour Code in 2005. We will try to demonstrate that the involvement of the 
main social partners-employers‟ associations and trade unions appears to be 
different from the “façade” consultation previously observed. In spite of the 
organisational fragmentation over the last 15 years of both trade unions and 
employers‟ associations and lack of interest representation tradition, as well as 
the consequent weak role assumed by these actors, already noticed by various 
authors in different studies concerning the whole region, and partly due to the 
absence of crystallisation of the interests to be represented, the amendments to 
the Romanian Labour Code illustrate a first attempt, for each of these actors, at 
effectively participating in this process, through the adoption of a “labour” and 
“employers” position. In this respect, our assumption brings a new analytical 
dimension, both from an empirical and a theoretical point of view.  
The paper is organised as follows: the first part will introduce our 
theoretical framework, drawn by Knoke‟s analytical perspective13. The second 
part is focused on the nature of the policy actors involved in this process and the power 
relations between them, while the third one is concerned with the peculiarities 
of the issue interest (the amendment of the Labour Code) under study. Some 
preliminary conclusions will be presented in the final in order to highlight the 
collective action dimension, analysed in terms of mobilisation and publicity. 
 
                                                          
12  Between 1996 and 2000 the number of civil society organisations increased, from 12.000 to 
27.000 at the end of the decade. See M. DE BELLET, “La société civile roumaine des années 90. 
Un rapport ambigu au politique”, Transitions, vol. XLII, no. 2, 2001, pp. 99-111; G. PIROTTE, 
“Société civile et transitions. Un regard sur l‟évolution du projet de constitution d‟une société 
civile en Roumanie post-communiste”, Transitions, vol. XLIII, no. 1, 2002, pp. 111-127.  
13  D. KNOKE et al., Comparing Policy Networks: Labor Politics in the US, Germany, and 
Japan, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.  
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2. Analytical framework 
 
From a theoretical point of view, the literature on interest representation 
has been dominated by two conceptual frameworks defined by Schmitter
14
 in 
the late 70‟s through juxtaposition15: the pluralism and the neocorporatism. 
However, these two models of interest group representation have been 
criticised by various authors for their weak analytical dimension and 
explicative power, as they are confined to two descriptive dimensions
16
 : one 
concerned with the “nature of the constitutive units”, the second one focused on 
the relationship between the State and the main social actors, trade unions and 
employers‟ associations.  
In spite of these limits and even if in Western democracies neo-
corporatism, which brings together in a “tight policy community the state and 
the interest groups representing capital and labour”17, has been declared dead 
many times, it still attracts scholarly attention
18
. Thus, the first studies related 
to the emergence of new social actors in Central and Eastern Europe and to the 
new industrial relations took into account the theoretical assumptions offered 
by these institutional configurations in order to give a first overview on this 
topic. The importance of these analyses, descriptive in nature for the most part, 
is undeniable, so that they tried to fill a gap in the existing literature concerning 
the multiple changes at work in post-communist democracies. These two 
theoretical models allowed researchers to answer a first series of questions and 
to conclude that the neo-corporatism in Central and Eastern Europe is highly 
different from the corporatism existing in Western democracies. As the 
“constitutive units” and relations between them were different in this part of the 
region from those of their western homologues, new “labels” have been 
introduced in the academic literature
19
. Meanwhile, it has to be mentioned that 
                                                          
14  P. SCHMITTER, “Still the Century of Corporatism?”, in P. Schmitter, G. Lehrnbruch (eds.), 
Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation, London, Sage Publications, 1979.  
15  L. GRAZIANO (1996), “Le pluralisme. Une analyse conceptuelle et comparative”, Revue   française 
de science politique, vol. 46, no. 2, 1996, pp. 195-224. 
16  Y. COHEN, F. PAVONCELLO, “Corporatism and Pluralism: A Critique of Schmitter‟s Typology”, 
British Journal of Political Science, vol. 17, no. 1, 1987, pp. 118. 
17  D. MARSH, “Policy networks concept in British Political Science: its applicability for Central 
and Eastern Europe”, Hungarian Centre of Democracy Studies Foundation, no. 71, 1993, p. 4. 
18  J. BLOM-HANSEN, “Organized interest and the state: A disintegration relationship? 
Evidence from Denmark”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 39, 2001, p. 391. 
19  Thus, Hausner qualified the relationship between state, trade unions and employers‟ 
associations in Central and Eastern Europe as a form of “proto-corporatism”. Ost, for its part, 
called them as being an “illusory corporatism”, only the “façade” of corporatism being present 
trough the region. Wiesenthal used the term of “semi corporatism” and Iankova argued about a 
“transformative corporatism”. See B. JESSOP, K. NIELSEN, J. HAUSNER, “Institutional 
Change in Post-Socialism”, in idem, Strategic Choice and Path Dependency in Post-Socialism 
4 
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these empirical observations are not a peculiarity of Central and Eastern 
Europe, due to their recent transition to democracy and market economy. In 
fact, in Western democracies “it has proven difficult to determine the directions 
in which corporatism is moving”20.  
As the aim of this paper is to analyse the involvement of employers‟ 
associations and trade unions in the process of amendment of the Romanian 
Labour Code and given that the neo-corporatist model of interest representation leaves 
aside the role of social actors in the policy processes, our attention is drawn to the 
analytical framework proposed by Knoke in a comparative study focused on labour 
policies in Germany, Japan and United States. Four analytical dimensions are taken 
into account in this attempt: the policy actors, the power relations, the policy 
interest, and the collective action, through which the author considers that a 
researcher can describe and analyse a “domain‟s policy making process”21.  
This kind of analysis implies to focus on the variety and the nature of 
actors involved in the policy process, in order to be able to highlight afterwards 
the power relations among them. From a general point of view, this approach is 
similar to the analytical dimensions proposed by Philippe Schmitter. 
Nevertheless, two other particular aspects enlarge this analytical framework: 
the policy interest and the collective action.  
As we cannot study the labour policies as a whole, the third dimension 
proposed – policy interest – gives the possibility to focus the investigation on a 
particular aspect in the process of decision-making. This is why our attention is 
drawn to a specific issue interest (the amendment of the Romanian Labour 
Code), terms that refers to a broadly characterised “set of substantives matters 
that attract the attention of some domain actors”22.  
Collective action represents the last step in analysing a process of 
decision-making and the involvement in it of the actors concerned. A collective 
action, as Knoke defined it, involves three or more organisations working 
together in an effort to obtain their preferred policy outcome
23
. The interest of 
the actors is at the origin of a collective action: “To say that an actor has an 
interest in a policy means that the outcome of a decision has consequences for 
this organisation and its constituents”24. Three types of collective actions can be 
identified: mobilisation (which refers to the collaboration between 
                                                                                                                                              
Institutional Dynamics in the Transformation Process, Aldershot, Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited, 1995, p. 11; D. OST, “Illusory Corporatism in Eastern Europe: Neoliberal Tripartism 
and  Postcommunist Class Identities”, Politics and Society, vol. 28, no. 4, 2000, pp. 504-8; H. 
WIESENTHAL(1996), “Organized Interests in Contemporary East Central Europe: Theoretical 
Perspectives and Tentative Hypotheses”, in A. AGH, op. cit., pp. 40-58; E. IANKOVA (1998), 
“The Transformative Corporatism of Eastern Europe”, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 
12, pp. 222-64. 
20  J. BLOM-HANSEN, art.cit., p. 391.  
21  D. KNOKE et al., op.cit., p. 11.  
22  Ibidem, p. 14.  
23  Ibidem, p. 20.  
24  Ibidem, p. 13. 
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organisations with the aim of achieving a collective goal), publicity (which 
refers to the choice of these organisations to express their preferences through 
the media) and lobbying (term related to the attempts at persuading 
governmental authorities to make favourable decisions). This former type of 
collective action will not be taken into account in our paper. As the amendment 
of the Roumanian Labour Code has taken place in the frame of the tripartite 
dialogue, we leave aside the “lobbying” dimension, understood as informal 
relations between organised interest and public authorities, characterized by a 
low degree of institutionalisation
25
.  
 
3. The involvement of employers associations and trade unions in 
the process of amendment of the Romanian Labour Code (2005) 
 
3.1. Policy actors  
 
3.1.a. Romanian employers’ associations  
 
The academic literature offers little substance about employers‟ 
association, in spite of the key position they hold in industrial relations in 
Western democracies
26
. There is a common view in the academic literature 
about the reputation of employers‟ associations of being less generous in 
responding to inquiries about their activities and internal affairs
27
. The 
Romanian case does not make any exception. Apart from a couple of articles
28
, 
the knowledge about employers and employers‟ associations across the region 
is rather limited. Meanwhile, our paper is concerned with the emergence of 
employers‟ associations in post-communist Romania as far as it attempts to 
understand the role that they play in a specific issue interest in labour policies: 
the amendment of the Labour Code.  
This part of the paper highlights two particular aspects with regard to the 
organisational development of Romanian employers‟ associations: the degree 
of fragmentation, their main characteristic in the first years of the transition to 
                                                          
25  P. MUNK CHRISTIANSEN, H. ROMMETVEDT, “From Corporatism to Lobbyisme? 
Parliaments, Executives and Organized Interests in Denmark and Norway”, Scandinavian 
Political Studies, vol. 22, no. 3, 1999, p. 196.  
26  J. Windmuller, A. Gladstone (eds.), Employers Associations and Industrial Relations. A 
Comparative Study, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984. 
27  In order to fill this gap with regard to empirical data, this part of the paper is the result of a 
detailed examination of the employer association‟s statutes, publications, press releases and 
newspaper articles.  
28  A. TRIF, “Overview of Industrial Relations in Romania”, South-East Europe Review, no. 2, 
2004, pp. 43-64; O. PLUMANDON, „Organisations patronales et tripartisme en République 
tchèque‟, Etudes du CEFRES,  no. 4, 2005.  
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democracy and market economy and the various attempts at organisational 
unification launched since 1995. By analysing the amendment of the Labour 
Code, we assume that for this particular issue interest and in spite of their internal 
competition in representing employers‟ interest in the Romanian politics, employers‟ 
associations have succeeded in establishing a common position, defended when 
confronted with trade unions and State authorities positions in this field.  
The representation of employers‟ interests is far to be a tradition in the 
Romanian political landscape. Before the establishment of the communist 
regime, as the process of industrialisation was not advanced, the number of 
employers to organise was reduced
29
. After 1945, when the main goal of the 
communist regime was intensive industrialisation, “there were virtually no 
private owners”30, but only the aim of transforming Romania into “workers society”.  
Consequently, as in other post-communist countries, Romanian 
employers‟ associations emerge in a context in which the State must enhance its 
powers to reduce its powers
31. Employers‟ organisations in this region have 
been created on an artificial basis with an important aid coming from the 
State
32. Focused on the Romanian case, Aurora Trif considers that “the 
legislative framework adopted after 1989 supported the emergence of 
employers‟ associations”33. From our point of view, this assumption regarding 
the State‟s contribution in the formation of these new actors should be 
moderated for the Romanian case. 
Since 1990 and until 2000 there was no legal provision stipulating the 
role and the mission of employers‟ association within the Romanian legal 
framework. The freedom of association has been granted in the first post-
communist Constitution of the country in 1991, but the legal basis for the 
formation of employers‟ associations was the same as for all non-governmental 
organisations (the law 21/1924). It is in 1998 that a legislative proposal has 
been submitted to the Parliament in this respect. As in 2000 the members of the 
Senate were still discussing the draft, the representatives of employers‟ 
association and Romanian business groups
34
 required, within a meeting with the 
                                                          
29  A. TRIF, art.cit. 
30  Ibidem. 
31  B. JESSOP, K. NIELSEN, J. HAUSNER, art.cit., p. 11. 
32  F. DRAUS, Les organisations patronales dans les pays de l’Europe centrale et orientale 
(Pologne, République Tchèque, Hongrie), Bruxelles, Institut Syndical Européen, Max Planck 
Institut fur Gesellschaftsforshung, 2000, p. 13.  
33  A. TRIF, art.cit., p. 46. In this article the author makes reference to the first post-
communist Romanian Constitution adopted in 1991. The article 37 of the Constitutions, modified 
in 2003, stipulated that citizens have the right to bring together “in political parties, trade unions 
and other kind of associations”.   
34  Among which the Businessmen‟s Association of Romania, the general Union of Romanian 
Industrialists 1903, the National Confederation of Romanian Employers, the National Council of 
Romanian Small and Medium sized Enterprises and the Romanian National Employers.  
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Prime Minister in office, Mugur Isarescu, a rapid adoption of the law, by an 
emergency ordinance
35
. The same argument comes from the President of the 
National Union of Romanian Employers, who emphasises our assumption when 
he states that Romanian politicians after 1989 did not support the formation of 
employers‟ associations. He argued that “the political class, or what this meant 
after 1989, did not vote for strong, well-established employers’ organisations 
that could represent a force in Romania’s economic and societal 
environment”36. Under these conditions, the employers‟ movement in Romania 
was rather concerned about its existence than about the economic transition
37
.  
However, Romania has the highest number of employers‟ associations in 
comparison with other countries in the region. Until 2000, employers‟ 
representation was dominated by 10 representative confederations
38
, while 
there is just one in Estonia and Latvia, two in Poland, Lithuania and the Czech 
Republic and nine competing confederations in Hungary
39
. Thus, fragmentation 
is not a Romanian peculiarity. Various authors who analyse the transformation 
of industrial relations in Central and Eastern Europe emphasise the high degree 
of fragmentation of employers‟ association in comparison with trade unions40. 
Once again, in this respect, as we will see in the following part of the paper, the 
Romanian case is not an exception.  
Two kinds of actors aiming at representing economic interest emerged in 
Romania since 1990. Because of the high degree of fragmentation, we 
borrowed from Wessels a typology realised by the author in order to face the 
diversity of business associations in OCDE. According to this classification, 
there are, on one hand, associations dealing with class interest (called 
employers‟ associations) and, on the other hand, those being trade associations 
or political think tanks of business not involved in the wage bargaining at all
41
. 
Thus, bearing in mind this classification, a close look at the year of 
establishment of Romanian employers‟ associations shows that most of them 
emerged between 1990 and 1999. All of the associations in the table below are 
representative at the national level.  
                                                          
35  “Oamenii de afaceri cer urgentarea legii patronatelor”, Capital, n° 19, 11 Mai 2000.  
36  MARIAN PETRE MILUŢ, President of the National Union of Romanian Employers, “Rolul 
mişcării patronale/The Role of Employers‟ Movement”, http://www.unpr.ro/english/rolmiscare.php   
37  “Patronatul în derivă”, Capital, n° 48, 30 November 2000.  
38  A. TRIF, art.cit., p. 47.  
39  M. MAILAND, J. DUE, “Social Dialogue in Central and Eastern Europe: Present State  
and Future Development”, European Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 10, no. 2, 2004, p. 182.  
40  T. COX, B. MASON (2000), “Interest Groups and Tripartism in East Central Europe”, European 
Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 6, no. 3, 2000, pp. 325-347; M. MAILAND, J. DUE, art. cit. 
41  B. WESSELS, “Systems of Economic Interest Groups and Socio-Economic Performance”, 
Paper prepared for delivery at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, August 29-September 8, 1996. 
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Year of 
establishment 
Employers‟ Associations 
1990 
PNR (Romanian National Employers) 
ARACO (Romanian Association of Building Entrepreneurs) 
CNIPMMR (National Council of Romanian Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) 
1991 UNPR (National Union of Romanian Employers) 
1992 
CONPIROM (Employers Confederation of Romanian Industry) 
CoNPR (National Council of Romanian Employers) 
UGIR (General Union of Romanian Industrialists) 
CNPR (National Confederation of Romanian Employers) 
1994 UGIR 1903 (General Union of Romanian Industrialists 1903) 
1999 VITAL (VITAL Confederation) 
 
In parallel, different other associations emerged with the aim at representing 
encompassing or specific economic interests: the Businessmen‟s Association of 
Romania (created in 1994), the Romanian Banking Association (1991), the European 
Initiative of the Business Environment, without neglecting the metamorphosis 
of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Romania and Bucharest.  
Aware of their weakness as a result of this fragmentation, the employers‟ 
associations took the initiative to “unify” the Romanian employers‟ movement. 
A first step in this sense was made in 1995, when 5 employers‟ association 
established a common association (called Romanian Employers
42
) with the aim 
at representing their interests at national and European level. As this umbrella 
association had a short existence, in 1999 the Businessmen‟s Association of 
Romania (AOAR)
43
  launched again this debate. A new umbrella association is 
created in 1999, called the Employers‟ Confederation of Romania44, with a 
membership not too much different from the previous one. In 2004 Romania 
was the only Central and Eastern European country with no representative within the 
Union of Industrial and Employers‟ Confederations of Europe (UNICE). As the 
high degree of fragmentation was the main remark coming from their European 
                                                          
42  This association was composed by the National Confederation of Romanian Employers 
(CNPR), the National Council of Romanian Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (CNIPMMR), the 
National Union of Romanian Employers (UNPR), the National Council of Romanian Employers 
(CoNPR) and the Romanian National Employers (PNR) – C. BARLEA et. al., Ghidul pentru dialog 
social şi parteneriat din România, Bucharest, Proconsult, Valahia, Institutul Manager, 1997, p. 143.  
43  “Its members are owners and managers of companies in all economic fields, active in 
Romania and in the large business centres all over the world, with a total turnover of more than 
one billion US $”, AOAR, “Presentation”, http://www.aoar.ro/pres_eng.htm   
44  The Employers‟ Confederation gathered 51 nationally representative employers‟ confederations, 
branch and regional employers‟ federations and various professional associations, as for example 
the National Confederation of Romanian Employers (CNPR), the National Council of Romanian Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises (CNIPMMR), the National Council of Romanian Employers (CoNPR), the 
Romanian National Employers (PNR), the National Association of Romanian Exporters and 
Importers (ANEIR) and the AOAR.  
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homologues in response to the Romanian demands of affiliation, in 2004 two 
main alliances are established, both created with the aim at unifying the movement and 
at obtaining recognition within the European/international employers‟ associations: 
the Romanian Employers‟ Confederation45 and the Union of Romanian Employers46. 
The only Romanian employers‟ association that preferred to stay outside these 
attempts at unifying the employers‟ movement is the UNPR (the National Union 
of Romanian Employers).  
Thus, as a preliminary conclusion, concerning the organisational development 
of Romanian employers‟ associations, note should be taken that the degree of 
organisational fragmentation tends to decrease. Additionally, the aim of this 
paper is to demonstrate that a similar trend could be observed with regard to interest 
representation when confronted with the State or trade unions‟ positions.    
 
3.1.b. Trade unions  
 
As the previous part of the paper was concerned with the organisational 
development of employers‟ associations, in what follows we will try to briefly 
reveal the main features of the trade union movement in post-communist Romania. 
By doing this, we will show that, as in the case of employers‟ associations, the 
labour actor has been characterised by a high degree of fragmentation too, that 
unions succeed in overcoming during the debates to the Labour Code.  
Historically, concerning the development of labour organisations, the 
Romanian case does not make an exception in the region. All over Eastern 
European borders, trade unions are merely developed between the two world 
wars. The retarded modernization is a common characteristic for the entire 
region, with the notable exception of Czechoslovakia, where a remarkable 
industrial development is noted, in the context of the parliamentary democracy. 
More specifically, regarding Romania, it has not a deep-rooted tradition of 
trade unionism. In a nutshell, as an important characteristic, Romanian trade 
unions develop under a strong incentive from the social-democrats and not as a 
spontaneous gathering of the working class. Following a regional common 
pattern, during the communist regime, trade unions were far from being 
independent. Indeed, with the exception of Solidarnosc in Poland, trade unions 
                                                          
45  In fact, in March 2004, the Romanian Employers‟ Confederation defines a new strategy in 
order to become member of UNICE: it changes its name in the Alliance of Romanians 
Employers‟ Confederations (ACPR) and includes new members (the Romanian Banking 
Association, ARB, the Romanian Employers Confederation of Industry, Services and commerce, 
CPISC and the Romanian Association of Building Entrepreneurs, ARACO) (“Patronatele fac 
alianţe şi uniuni din dorinţa de a deveni reprezentative”, Gardianul, 23 March 2004).  
46  At the opposite side, the Union of Romanian Employers (UAR) gathers together the 
Romanian Employers, UGIR 1903, UGIR, PNR, the National Council of Romanian Employers 
(CoNPR) and CNIPMMR (previously member of the concurrent umbrella organisation) (“Alianţa 
Patronatelor”, Jurnalul Naţional, 24 March 2004).  
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served as an instrument in controlling the workplaces. In this way, they fill out 
the role of “transmission belt” 47. From the organisational point of view, in 1966 
a unique structure is created, gathering all member unions, named the General 
Trade Union Confederation of Romania
48
. Consequently, there was an 
important functional and organisational underdevelopment, which further 
stamped the post-communist destiny of the trade unions.  
During the post-communist period, several aspects related to the trade 
unions‟ organisation derive from the legislative provisions in the matter. The 
creation and functioning of trade unions are included mainly in the Constitution 
adopted the 8
th
 December 1991
49
 and in the law concerning trade unions more 
specifically, law 54/1991, modified in 2003
50
. A national representative trade 
union must be recognized by court and then sanctioned by the government; for 
this, it must gather 5% of the active population, 1/3 of the economic sectors and 
1/2 of the regions of the countries
51
.   
As such, the decentralisation of trade unionism is a direct consequence of 
the legal framework, three levels of interest representation being in place: 
enterprise level, sectoral level and national confederation, each one with its 
particular juridical personality and statutes
52
. Mihes and Casale argue that one 
important outcome of trade union freedom is that various trade unions may be 
established in the same industry, in the same field of activity or even in the 
same enterprise
53
. As the authors underline it, at a more general level, this 
raises the question of the “adequate manner” of interest representation and of 
efficacy in promoting general interest. Taking into account these elements, we 
argue more precisely that to this particular setting, trade unions‟ potential of 
coalition is ex ante limited, therefore their relevance in terms of supporting 
policies and social interests is relatively low. 
At present, only five national confederations are fulfilling the criteria for 
representativeness from 2003
54
: the National Confederation of Free Trade 
                                                          
47  Since 1968, trade unions are part of the “Democratic Front and Socialist Unity”, mass 
organisation that affiliates all the organisations subordonated to the party. Trade unions are active 
in all branches and are organised at central level by the General Trade Union Confederation of 
Romania (UGSR), no other trade union activity being authorised. Party‟s monopoly on this 
structure is absolute, the leader of the Confederation is subordinated to the communist party‟s 
secretary and party‟s activists are also members of the trade union. 
48  A. TRIF, art.cit., p. 52. 
49  The right of forming trade unions is guaranteed by article 37, paragraph I of the Constitution 
– “citizens can freely form political parties, trade unions and other associational forms”.  
50  Law No. 54/24 January 2003, published in Monitorul Oficial No. 073, 5 February 2003. 
51  F. DRAUS, art.cit., p. 13. 
52  C. MIHES, G. CASALE, “Industrial Relations in Romania”, in G. Casale (ed.) Social 
Dialogue in Central Eastern Europe, International Labour Office Central and Eastern European 
Team, Budapest, 1999, p. 275. 
53  Ibidem. 
54  Apart from these five main confederations, other trade unions partially fulfil the 
representative criteria, but they are sometimes admitted to negotiations and are bargaining freely 
with employers‟ associations. One of the best examples is the Confederation of Non-Aligned 
Trade Unions, a confederation that declared, since its foundation (formed the 10th November 
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Unions from România – Frăţia (CNSLR-Frăţia), the National Trade Unions 
Bloc (BNS), the National Confederation of Trade Unions “Cartel Alfa” (CNS 
“Cartel Alfa”), the National Confederation of Democratic Trade Unions from 
Romania (CSDR) and the Confederation Meridian
55
. 
 
Year of 
establishment 
Trade Unions Membership Represented sectors 
1990 CNSLR-Frăţia56 800.00057 
Present in almost all 
the sectors 
1991 BNS 375.00058 
Transports, energy, car 
manufacturing, 
telecommunications, 
health, public 
administration 
1990 Cartel Alfa59 325.000 
Mines, education, 
banks, tourism, 
agriculture, transports, 
public administration 
1994 CSDR 345.000 
Education, health, food 
industry, textiles 
1994 Meridian 170.000 
Mining, metallurgy, 
chemicals 
 
Source: Websites of trade unions, Ciutacu et al. (2001), Peyroux (2002: 94) 
 
We can already notice that one of the most important characteristics of 
trade unionism in Romania is the particular fragmentation of the national 
                                                                                                                                              
1993), the independence and neutrality in respect to the government, political parties and trade 
unions. There are also some strong federations at sectoral level (in mining, education, commerce, health) 
and also some small trade unions that are not affiliated. See C. CIUTACU, S. PERT, V. VASILE, 
Rapport sur le dialogue social en Roumanie, à la demande des partenaires sociaux européens 
CES/UNICE-UEAPME/CEEP, 2001, p. 7. 
55  Meridian confederation was formed in 1997 and replaces the Romanian Coal Workers 
Trade Union Confederation (CSMR) formed in 1991 by coal workers from the Jiu Valley. We did 
not succeed in obtaining much information about its functioning and activities, but we took note 
of the unanimous opinion of several trade union leaders from other confederations that argued 
about the marginal role of Meridian in Romanian trade union movement. 
56  CNSLR-Frăţia is, in the first years following the fall of the communist regime, a distinct 
organization. In 1990, CNSLR is formed on the basis of former communist structures, and in the 
same year the Fratia trade union is also formed. They merge in 1993. 
57  www.cnslr-fratia.ro  
58  www.bns.ro  
59  Cartel Alfa covers 36 professional federations, 3 trade unions‟ centrales (federation of specific 
sectoral federations). These sectoral federations are : the Confederative National Confederation of 
Romanian Coal Workers Trade Unions, Agricultural Central CERES and National Trade Union Central 
Alfa Metal (metallurgy, siderurgy) – (O. PEYROUX,  Pouvoir et démocratie en Roumanie : le 
rôle des contre-pouvoirs associatifs et syndicaux, DHERS de Sociologie sous la direction de 
Maxime Haubert, Université Paris I, 2002, p. 94) 
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landscape. Indeed, trade unions have moved from the subordinate position and 
the organisational unity during communism to organisational fragmentation and 
various ideological orientations
60
. 
Besides these important features concerning the organisation of the labour 
actor, we should also take notice of some aspects related to the post-communist 
context in which trade unions represent interests. The most important 
challenges refer to the economic de-industrialisation of an obsolete industry, 
the creation of a private sector in economy, the development of an 
entrepreneurial class and the reform of labour relations
61
. These essential 
aspects entitle us to believe that social-economic factors played an important 
role in increasing the difficulty of the labour actor in focusing on representing 
interests. Directly related to our present research on the Labour Code 
amendments, we believe that besides the high degree of fragmentation, the 
socio-economic context also prevented trade unions from adopting a more 
unified approach and position.  
 
3.1.c. State 
As it was previously argued, both employers‟ associations and trade unions 
emerge in a particular political and economic context, in which the State has to 
enforce its powers to reduce its powers. The State was invited by the European and 
other international institutions, that have scrutinised the progresses accomplished by 
this country over the last few years, to contribute to the formation of these new 
social actors in order to enable them to take effectively part in the domestic 
policy-making process in the context of the European accession.  
Nevertheless, as it has been highlighted in a previous section of this article, 
with regard to the employers‟ association the legal framework concerning their 
creation and role on the Romanian political landscape has not been adopted without 
difficulties. This is why in 2001, the European Commission, in its Regular 
Report, recommended to the Romanian government “to help the social partners to 
develop their capacities before they can play an active role in the EU 
context”62.  
                                                          
60  National confederations declare different ideological orientations, but this is mainly derived 
from their international affiliation, than from stable relations with political parties. CNSLR-Fratia 
and BNS proclaim themselves as Social democrat and are members of the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), Cartel Alfa and CSDR are Christian democrat, 
affiliated to the World Confederation of Labour (WCL). They all are members of the European 
Trade Union Confederation (ETUC). Compared to employers‟ associations, trade unions become 
more quickly integrated into international structures. 
61  H. VAN ZON, “Alternative Scenarios for Central Europe” in J. HAUSNER, B. JESSOP, 
K. NIELSEN, op.cit., p. 116. 
62 Regular Report on Romania’s Progress towards Accession (2001), Commission of the 
European Communities, pp. 66-67.  
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Since the collapse of communism, the State monopolised the decision-making 
process in the field of industrial relations, partly because of the “weakness” of 
both trade unions and employers‟ associations. However, the representatives of 
employers‟ associations consider that the State was not very interested in 
collaborating with them
63. According to some representatives of employers‟ 
associations, the State took different engagements at the international level 
without consulting the associations, even if they were the main actors 
concerned. Consultation often took place outside the tripartite framework and 
on the initiative of employers‟ associations or trade unions64.  
 
3.2. Power relations 
 
Tripartite arrangements can further illustrate the State‟s main impact, as well 
as the reduced role of the other two social actors. In order to better illustrate 
this assumption, we will briefly assess the main features of tripartism in 
Romania throughout the transition period. Indeed, this aspect allows us to 
present the power relations that trade unions and employers‟ associations have 
with the State. 
As in other neighbouring countries, tripartite institutions emerge in 
Romania too. Contrary to other CEECs, a tripartite institution becomes formal 
rather late in Romania, more precisely, in 1997, when the Economic and Social 
Council (CES) begins to function
65
.  
Without any doubt, tripartism is contributing to the legitimisation of 
social actors and to their consolidation as government‟s partners in economic 
and social issues. Even more, the tripartite system is also serving government‟s 
interests, because it realises a large social consensus on economic reforms, 
which have a high-cost social impact. During the transition period, several 
                                                          
63  “Oamenii de afaceri au fost iar la Cotroceni. DA dialogului cu puterea, NU alegerilor 
anticipate şi grevei generale”, Azi, 23 March 1999.  
64  In order to highlight the peculiarities of this collaboration, there is one illustrative example. 
In 1999, when the international financial institutions refuse Romania‟s request for a financial 
support, the Romanian State reorients its demand to the Romanian employers, who engage 
themselves on the international capital market in order to help the State with a loan64. This 
example determines us to moderate the idea of the weakness of employers‟ associations and to 
further highlight the idea that more attention should be paid to conceptualising distinctive criteria 
in defining the “weakness” of social actors  (“AOAR vrea să împrumute 300 mil. $ de pe 
piaţa externă”, Ziarul Financiar, 24 March 1999).  
65  At present, 27 members compose the CES, each part (government, trade unions, employers‟ 
associations) delegating 9 members. The Council has mainly an advisory role and can propose 
legislative measures regarding the restructuring and development of the economy, privatisation of 
enterprises, monetary and fiscal policies, education, research and culture. On labour conflict 
issues, the CES has the role of a mediator, analysing causes and proposing solutions. The 
institution also monitors the respect of international labour legislation, stipulated by the ILO 
Convention no. 144 from 1976 – www.ces.ro.  
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agreements are signed, in order to ensure the social peace necessary to the 
implementation of reforms.  
Nevertheless, as in other CEECs, Romanian tripartite framework has 
encountered numerous problems of functioning and we can notice the 
imbalance of power between the labour actor, the employers‟ associations and 
the State. Indeed, governmental authorities are establishing the agenda and in 
many cases social partners‟ positions have been ignored. Labour 
marginalisation has been frequent in Romania, which is not an exception at 
regional scale
66
. Many important issues regarding social and economic aspects 
are frequently discussed in the parliamentary arena, from which social actors 
are often excluded
67
. Debates are almost entirely held with the government, and 
social partners do not participate in negotiations of international agreements 
(with the IMF, WB, European Union etc). Tripartism lock-out has been noticed 
and the development of social dialogue was the object of numerous critics
68
.  
Focusing on the Labour Code amendment, in the next section we will try 
to demonstrate that in this particular issue labour unions and employers‟ 
associations have put an end to this situation and by freely negotiating, without 
further involvement of the State, they comply with their representational mission.  
 
 
3.3. Issue interest – the amendment of the Labour Code 
 
The amendment of the Labour Code has been taken here as example in 
order to illustrate the role played by these actors in order to test our hypothesis.  
                                                          
66  This phenomenon is common to other CEECs as well. In the Czech Republic, Klaus‟ 
government has systematically tried to marginalise tripartite structures: the General Agreement, a 
declaration on the minimum wage, wage indexation, social policy and employment, established in 
January 1991 was, in many occasions, not respected by the government (See POLLERT, A., 
1999, POLLERT, A., 1997, 3 (2): 203-228). In Bulgaria, the National Council for Tripartite 
Collaboration was criticised on many occasions by the trade unions, being considered as an 
“instrument” in the hands of the government (See PETKOV, K., GRADEV, G., 1991; COX, T., 
MASON, B., 2000, 6 (3): 325-347).  
67  D. SANDOR, “Consiliul Economic şi Social şi dialogul social. Raport de evaluare :   
performanţe, vulnerabilităţi, oportunităţi şi riscuri” , Programul “Action Plan to Promote the   
Culture and Practice of Social Dialogue and of Participation of Civil Society and Related   
Networks in the South Eastern European Region (Romania)”, p. 11. 
68  As for example in November 2002, when four national union confederations (Cartel Alfa, 
BNS, CSDR, Meridian) and two employers‟ associations (General Union of Employers from the 
Romanian Industry and the National Council of Employers from Romania) announced their 
intention of walking out the tripartite institution, because of the “complete marginalization of 
social partners and of the social dialogue concept”68. In their view, only 30% of law projects that 
have been adopted have also been submitted to the CES and less than 1% of the remarks of the 
social partners have been integrated. 
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As in other policy matters, throughout the transition, labour legislation in 
Romania has had to be amended in order to ensure full alignment with the 
social policy acquis and with the international norms. In spite of these 
obligations, from the European Commission‟s point of view, since the 
beginning of the negotiations of accession and until 2002, not many legislative 
developments could be recorded in this field.  
Among the legal provisions to be adopted, the approval of a new Labour 
Code was a particular priority. In 2003, the Labour Code elaborated in 1973 
was still in force, with the exception of certain amendments related for example 
to the abrogation of political duties of the workers, the reduction of the working 
time from 48 hours per week to 40 hours and the removal of the obligation to 
ensure employment stability
69
. The drafting process of this new Labour Code 
started in 2000, but it entered into force only in March 2003. As in this paper 
our attention is focused on the second revision of the Labour Code, which took place 
in 2005, we will not get into details about this first drafting process. 
Meanwhile, before going any further, we consider important to introduce some 
empirical data in order to understand the positions and the power relations 
between the actors involved in the process of amendment of the Labour Code in 
2005.  
The Labour Code adopted in 2003 offered a series of privileges to trade 
unions. Many articles were ambiguous and did not offer the legal endorsement 
so business associations can take the necessary measures in cases of inadequate 
accomplishment of duties from the part of employees. As a matter of fact, 
employers‟ associations expressed their discontent about these new amendments, 
claiming that their points of view were not properly considered in the drafting 
process
70
. For them, the Code, in the shape adopted in 2003, was encouraging 
moonlighting, reducing labour‟s productivity, increasing taxes and generating 
bankruptcy
71. As a representative of an employers‟ association stated: “the new 
Code transformed enterprises into social welfare institutions”72. Under these 
conditions, employers‟ associations, on an individual basis in an initial phase 
and commonly afterwards, required its revision in order to ensure certain equity 
between labour and employers
73. In May 2003, seven employers‟ associations, 
those which founded a year later the Union of Romanian Employers (UAR), 
demanded to the government the modification of the Code.  
Although all these demands coming from employers‟ associations had 
had no impact on the state authorities‟ position, in 2004, in order to assume the 
obligations of the EU membership, but also other international requirements, 
                                                          
69  A. TRIF (2004), loc.cit., p. 45.  
70  “Patronii cer modificarea legii intrate în vigoare la 1 martie 2003”, Jurnalul Naţional, 7 May 2005.  
71  Ibid. 
72  Ibid. 
73  Statement of the representative of UGIR 1903 (General Union of Romanian Industrialists 1903), 
“Patronii cer modificarea legii intrate în vigoare la 1 martie 2003”, Jurnalul Naţional, 7 May 2005. 
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the Romanian government faced the need to amend the Labour Code entered into 
force in 2003. These international requirements were formulated by 
international financial institutions, like the World Bank, the IMF and foreign 
investors, in relation with the flexibility of the market and extensive business 
opportunities in Romania.
 
The process of amendment had to be achieved until 
the end of the year, but, in an electoral context, the schedule could not be 
fulfilled.  
 
3.4. Collective action 
 
Consequently, this issue becomes a major legislative priority for the new 
government in office at the beginning of 2005. This process of amendment 
proceeded into two steps.  
First, the Ministry of Labour worked at the elaboration of amendments. 
Secondly, the Minister in office, who tried to play a role of mediation
74
, invited 
the representatives of trade unions and employers‟ associations to discuss the 
proposed amendments.  
Thus, on one hand, the trade unions to a large extent against the 
amendment of the Code adopted in 2003, addressed to the government a first 
series of criticisms with regard to the modifications and debates became more 
intense in February 2005. The draft was considered a “World Bank product” 
and trade unions decided unanimously to reject all propositions when the 
amendments will be presented
75
. For these reasons, the first time when the 
representatives of trade unions, employers‟ associations met the Minister in 
office, the former, after having presented some general principles and once 
again their disapproval with regard to the content of the Labour Code under 
discussion, required to discuss this matter with the Prime minister in office only.  
On the other hand, at the opposite side, employers‟ associations 
formulated a common position emphasising the need to amend the Code, in 
order to ensure the flexibility of the market and to eliminate all the confusing 
legal provisions. These general principles were expressed and made known to 
the public by all the employers‟ associations, representative at the national 
level
76
, in spite of their past controversial relations, for the most part due to the 
competition established among them for obtaining recognition at both national 
and European level.  
Within the dialogue between the representatives of trade unions, 
employers‟ associations and the Minister, each of them has the opportunity to 
express a point of view with regard to the 63 amendments proposed by the 
                                                          
74  Rompres, “Guvernul va adopta un nou Cod al Muncii în luna martie », 11 February 2005.  
75  Ziua Newspaper, 9 February 2005 – http://www.ziua.ro/prt.php?id=3581&data=2005-02-09 
76  Rompres, “Punct de vedere unitar al patronilor asupra Codului Muncii”, 17 February 2005.  
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Public Ministry. Once again, employers‟ associations made known their point 
of view unanimously. Both the representatives of trade unions and those of 
employers‟ associations expressed their preferences via the media. On the one hand, 
the Alliance of Romanians Employers‟ Confederations (ACPR) in collaboration 
with the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) in Romania organised 
information campaigns emphasising the need to amend the Labour Code and 
explaining the importance of some amendments for the national economy
77
.  
Regarding trade unions, they also adopted a common action on this 
issue
78
. Following Knoke et alii conceptual framework, labour‟s collective 
action in the Labour Code issue, as in the employers‟ association case, had two 
main dimensions, mobilisation and publicity. Compared with employers‟ 
associations, the five national confederations put in place a common schedule 
of protests, including actions at prefects‟ establishments, in departments 
throughout the country, participation at the euromanifestation organised by the 
ETUC in March in Brussels against liberalization of services on the European 
internal market, and a final action that would be a general strike, in order to 
paralyse the entire economy. On many occasions, they demanded the government‟s 
resignation. The legitimation for labour‟s action was increased by the participation 
of trade unions‟ representatives to the euromanifestation, Romanian national 
confederations declared before the event that the Labour Code issue and that 
government and employers‟ associations‟ attack on the interests of the workforce 
and their representatives would be raised in Brussels
79
. And as a consequence 
of labour‟s mobilisation, the bipartite discussions between social partners were 
marked by protests throughout the country, which mobilised the main economic 
sectors, as for example transports
80
.  
                                                          
77  Rompres, “Patronatele au lansat un program de informare asupra necesităţii modificării 
Codului muncii”, 25 March 2005.  
78  Particular sensitive points for them concerning the amendments to the Labour Code were 
related to the possible introduction of labour contracts on a determined period as a rule and not as 
an exception, the obligation for the employee to work after the normal program if the employer 
asks it or the issue of eliminating trade unions from the procedures of establishing adequate 
labour norms; trade unions rejected also: abrogation of the Labour Code article which stipulated 
that the national labour contract applies to all commercial societies in Romania; elimination of 
measures concerning employees‟ protection in case of bankruptcy; measures that endorsed 
employers in making arbitrarily collective and individual firings; elimination of the obligation for 
the employers to regularly inform employees on economic and financial issue of the society and 
also issues of employment relations“ – Adevărul Newspaper, 11 February 2005. 
79  Trade union sources estimate that the Romanian participation was of about 1.000 trade 
unionists, from CNSLR-Frăţia, Cartel Alfa, BNS, CSDR, and was considered the most numerous 
delegation from Central and Eastern Europe – www. cnslr-fratia.ro 
80  Organised labour from this sector gained an important visibility in this period. At the 
Labour Code issue other specific major problems were raised by the National Convention of 
Transports, like the negotiation of a new labour contract for railways. This sectoral structure 
reunites almost all trade unions from this branch. The president of the National Convention of 
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Secondly, labour realised some important publicity actions through 
media channels. They particularly emphasised the support of main external 
actors, like the International Labour Organization, or to European documents, 
as for example the European Social Charter revised
81. Labour‟s position was 
also strengthened by the official signals from foreign institutions, like the 
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), the World Confederation of 
Labour (WCL) and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU)
82
. Also, it is important to notice that the Labour Code created the 
opportunity for trade unions to publicly state their anger concerning labour 
relations and social dialogue in Romania and to demand extensive labour 
involvement in issues which directly concern their constituencies. In fact, trade 
unions‟ actions had the objective to defend the interest of their members, and by this, 
they also raised important questions that concerned more particularly labour as an 
organisation trying to obtain visibility and impact in the political and social life.  
As a consequence, through a unified collective action, through mobilisation 
and publicity, labour succeeds in reaching an agreement with the employers‟ 
associations, a compromise accepted by both parts. The mobilisation was 
realised commonly by the five representative trade unions, which organised 
protest actions throughout the country and stated publicly, on numerous 
occasions, their common position and intention of not giving up. The relation 
of power that until this moment had been dominated by the State, is modified 
and the two social partners, trade unions and employers‟ associations fulfil 
their national representative mission and negotiate over an issue that has major 
consequences on both their constituencies. Furthermore, labour and employers 
in Romania take advantage of this legislative moment and assess their impact 
on social and political issues
83
.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Our paper aimed at exploring labour and employers‟ associations‟ 
mobilisation in Romania during the debates for the amendment of the Labour 
                                                                                                                                              
Transports, Ioan Radoi, also senator of the social-democrat Party (PSD), the opposition party 
since the 2004 elections, combined labour related issues with political issues, further claiming 
that the government should resign – Adevărul Newspaper, 24 February 2005, Ziua Newspaper, 
11 March 2005: http://www.ziua.net/display.php?id=6442&data=2005-03-11 
81  9AM Newspaper, 10 February 2005  
82  These organisations warned the Romanian government about the necessity of respecting the 
values of the European Social Model, especially those related to social dialogue and reminded 
that the “salvgardation clause” could be activated in the case of non-respect of social rights, 
which would finally postpone Romania‟s adhesion to the European Union: Adevărul Newspaper, 
24 February 2005. 
83  Labour unions have exploited the Labour Code negotiations in order to debate on other 
“hot” issues, like the situation of social dialogue in Romania, or employment relations in large 
companies, as we mentioned the situation in the transports. 
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Code in 2005. Our assumption was that, in their own field of interest, trade 
unions and employers‟ associations succeed in overcoming the organisational 
fragmentation and the internal battle for representativeness, in order to present 
a common position and to negotiate as unified actors.  
In order to be able to analyse each actor‟s mobilisation, we made appeal 
to Knoke‟s analytical framework. This allowed us, in a first part, to study the 
most important features of the actors involved in the process of legislative 
changes to the Labour Code, the employers‟ associations, trade unions and the 
State. Furthermore, we were able to apprehend the power relations between 
employers‟ them over the last few years. Several conclusions are obvious for 
the situation preceding the Labour Code debates in 2005. 
Regarding employers‟ associations, we can briefly notice several aspects. 
First of all, there is a considerable delay in establishing a legal framework of 
functioning, which finally becomes effective in 2000. Second of all, until recently, 
the Romanian employers‟ associations‟ landscape is characterised by a very 
high degree of fragmentation, the task of identifying national representative 
organisations being very difficult. Lately, taking into account the repeated 
criticisms from international organisations, like UNICE and the attempts of the 
Romanian employers‟ associations to integrate such a structure, the fragmentation 
trend seems to be decreasing, several organisations reuniting under common 
structures. But overall, internal fights for visibility and representativeness 
inside the employers „associations‟ movement mark the great part of the post-
communist period.  
On the trade unions side, some aspects need to be emphasised. First of 
all, there is a genetically based explanation. Trade unionism experiences an 
historical difficulty, related to the underdevelopment from the pre-communist 
period, further accentuated by the communist settings. Second of all, in the 
post-communist period, specific factors related to the trade union movement 
itself are playing a decisive role. The decentralisation is sometimes an obstacle 
to a coherent internal decision-making process and the fragmentation of the 
overall movement leads to a lack of coordination between the unions
84
. 
Consequently, organisational fragmentation is followed by a fragmentation of 
interest, labour unions adopting mostly individual positions. Third of all, we 
consider that the post-communist socio-economic context and the decision-making 
framework contribute to the difficulty of interest representation and to the 
imbalance of power relations, which privileges the State. Many difficulties 
were produced by radical economic reforms, privatisation and de-
                                                          
84  In a study on the variations in trade union effectiveness in Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, Avdagic draws the attention on the mode of inter-union dynamics. The author 
demonstrates that in Central and Eastern Europe, “rivalry and hostility between unions not only 
increases coordination problems, but also strengthens the government‟s position vis-à-vis 
organized labor, thus weakening its incentives to cede to labor demands” (AVDAGIC, 2003: 23). 
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industrialisation. Painful social costs related to these have undermined labour‟s 
social basis, overall inconsistent and diminished. 
The study of the emergence of social actors and the particular context in 
which they act entitled us to further enlighten the power relations between the 
social actors and the State. We underlined the general requirement that the 
State should stimulate social actors‟ participation in the policy-making, but also 
State‟s numerous attempts of limiting social actors‟ intervention and 
marginalizing them in the tripartite institutions. That is why we consider that 
there is an imbalanced relationship between employers‟ associations, trade 
unions and the State. Indeed, State‟s authority tends to be largely dominant and 
social actors frequently excluded from the decision-making process. 
Taking into account these observations on the nature of actors and on the power 
relation between them, at this moment we can briefly conclude about the Labour Code 
issue interest and the mobilisation of both employers‟ associations and trade unions. 
Consequently, we consider that in spite of the already mentioned 
difficulties of collaboration and adoption of a common position, the Labour 
Code issue introduces a new logic both on the employers‟ and the union‟ side, a 
unity of interest being addressed in their camps. Overcoming fragmentation and 
polarisation, employers‟ associations and labour unions make appeal to 
mobilisation and publicity, two dimensions that further allow them to state their 
point of view and to negotiate freely, without State‟s intervention, on the 
Labour Code legislative changes.   
The analysis of the process of amendment of the Romanian Labour Code 
invites us to observe that the collective action put in place by both employers‟ 
associations and trade unions involves not only their domestic homologues, but 
also a series of associations which, at the European or international level, 
represent labour or capital interest of their members. Another particular aspect 
to be highlighted is the context in which the Labour Code has been changed. Its 
amendment was not only a condition formulated by the European Commission 
in the Regular Reports, but also a condition required by international financial 
institutions, in order to make the Romanian business environment more 
attractive for investment. The participation at the drafting process of a foreign 
specialist, as well as the mobilisation of trade unions against his involvement, 
should be noted too. In further analysis it could be useful to study these 
external factors that intervene in this domestic process of decision-making, as 
well as their role in the process of unification of employers‟ movement.  
Our present research draws light on some perspectives that need further 
exploring. For example, it would be interesting to investigate whether this issue is 
going to have an influence on other political decisions, as well as on trade 
unions‟ and employers‟ associations‟ future actions or whether it is going to remain 
an isolated episode. 
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